Chapter 8 Using Field Experiments to Understand Information as an Antidote to Corruption

Matthew S. Winters, Paul Testa and Mark M. Fredrickson

A chapter in New Advances in Experimental Research on Corruption, 2012, pp 213-246 from Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Abstract: In observational data, access to information is associated with lower levels of corruption. This chapter reviews a small but growing body of work that uses field experiments to explore the mechanisms behind this relationship. We present a typology for understanding this research based on the type of corruption being addressed (political vs. bureaucratic), the mechanism for accountability (retrospective vs. prospective), and the nature of the information provided (factual vs. prescriptive). We describe some of the tradeoffs involved in design decisions for such experiments and suggest directions for future research.

Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:rexezz:s0193-2306(2012)0000015010

DOI: 10.1108/S0193-2306(2012)0000015010

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