Revisiting the Effect of Voter Isolation
Alexander James and
Jason Shogren ()
A chapter in Replication in Experimental Economics, 2015, vol. 18, pp 137-152 from Emerald Publishing Ltd
Abstract Does social-isolation deflate observed preferences for public goods? Using a voting referendum elicitation mechanism, List et al. (2004) document a 30% reduction in affirmative voting when votes are privately, rather than publicly, cast for a public good. We replicate this work and then add to the exercise by examining the role that group size plays in generating social-pressure bias – an extension we motivate with a structural model. Having replicated to the extent possible the List et al.’s consequential private and public treatments, we find that when group size is large (N?=?60), social isolation reduces affirmative votes by roughly 30%, a result that does not carry over to the small-group (N?=?30) session.
Keywords: Voting referendum; social isolation; preference revelation; C9; H4; Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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