Cheap Talk Games: Comparing Direct and Simplified Replications

Fu-Wen Hsieh and Joseph Wang

A chapter in Experiments in Organizational Economics, 2016, vol. 19, pp 19-38 from Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Abstract: To study strategic information transmission in organizations, we conduct a simplified version (with only three states) of the sender-receiver game experiment designed by Wang, Spezio, and Camerer (2010), in which an informative sender advises an uninformed receiver to take an action (to match the true state), but has incentives to exaggerate. We also have the same subjects play the original five-state game. We find similar “overcommunication” behavior with Taiwanese subjects – messages reveal more information about the true state than what equilibrium predicts – that let us classify subjects into various level-ktypes. However, results from the simplified version are closer to equilibrium prediction, with more senders robustly classified as level-2.

Keywords: Sender-receiver game; strategic information transmission; lying; laboratory experiment; C72; C91; D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:rexezz:s0193-230620160000019002

DOI: 10.1108/S0193-230620160000019002

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