INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN SHERMAN ACT MONOPOLIZATION CASES

Robert W Crandall and Kenneth Elzinga

A chapter in Antitrust Law and Economics, 2004, pp 277-344 from Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Abstract: While the popular image of the Sherman Act is that of a “trust-busting” statute, conduct remedies have been more common than structural relief. This paper evaluates the effect on economic welfare of conduct remedies that have resulted from ten prominent Sherman Act monopolization cases. In general, we find that in some cases the behavioral relief has had no consequence other than the cost of litigation and cost of compliance; in other cases, the remedies probably reduced consumer welfare. Cases studied are United Shoe Machinery, AT&T, Std. Oil of California, IBM, United Fruit, Kodak, Safeway, GM, Jerrold, and Blue Chip Stamp.

Date: 2004
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:rlwezz:s0193-5895(04)21005-3

DOI: 10.1016/S0193-5895(04)21005-3

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