Market Concentration, Multi-Market Participation and Antitrust

Dennis L. Weisman

A chapter in Research in Law and Economics, 2007, pp 233-257 from Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Abstract: This article explores the trade-offs between market concentration and multi-market participation in evaluating proposed mergers. For complementary demands, the price-decreasing effect of multi-market participation provides a countervailing influence on the price-increasing effect of higher concentration. The larger the footprint of the multi-market provider, the greater the likelihood the price-decreasing effect dominates. Higher concentration may be consistent with non-increasing prices despite the absence of merger economies. In the case of substitutes, multi-market participation compounds the price-increasing effect of higher concentration. Merger guidelines that place undue emphasis on market concentration can lead policymakers to block mergers that enhance consumer welfare and vice versa.

Date: 2007
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.101 ... d&utm_campaign=repec (text/html)
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.101 ... d&utm_campaign=repec (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:rlwezz:s0193-5895(06)22008-6

DOI: 10.1016/S0193-5895(06)22008-6

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Research in Law and Economics from Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Emerald Support ().