Bargeld-Seigniorage in der EWU - Hindernis für einen effizienten Zahlungsverkehr?

Carsten Lange and Torben Lütje
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Torben Luetje ()

Chapter 5 in List Forum Band 30, 2004, vol. 1, pp 69-80 from List Gesellschaft e.V.

Abstract: In the European Monetary Union the seigniorage to the member countries is organized in a specific way. On the one hand, the seigniorage generated by the issue of Euro bills is profit of the European Central Bank that is distributed by a determined key. On the other hand, the member countries gain the seigniorage of Euro coinage directly. Due to this inconsistency a change in denomination (e.g. a substitution of Euro bills by Euro coins et vice versa) will cause redistribution effects among the member countries. This could hamper an adjustment of denomination being necessary due to efficiency reason. This paper analyzes and quantifies the redistribution effects considering a simulated substitution of 5 Euro bills by 5 Euro coins. (Original text only available in german language)

Keywords: European Monetary Union; seigniorage; Euro (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lst:lfchap:30-05

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in List Forum Chapter from List Gesellschaft e.V. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lukas Wnuk Lipinski ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).