The Theory of Collusion and Competition Policy, vol 1

Harrington, Joseph E. , (harrij@wharton.upenn.edu)
Additional contact information
Harrington, Joseph E. ,: The Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania , Business Economics & Public Policy Department

in MIT Press Books from The MIT Press

Abstract: Collusion occurs when firms in a market coordinate their behavior for the purpose of producing a supracompetitive outcome. The literature on the theory of collusion is deep and broad but most of that work does not take account of the possible illegality of collusion. Recently, there has been a growing body of research that explicitly focuses on collusion that runs afoul of competition law and thereby makes firms potentially liable for penalties. This book, by an expert on the subject, reviews the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, with a focus on two issues: the impact of competition law and enforcement on whether, how long, and how much firms collude; and the optimal design of competition law and enforcement. The book begins by discussing general issues that arise when models of collusion take into account competition law and enforcement. It goes on to consider game-theoretic models that encompass the probability of detection and penalties incurred when convicted, and examines how these policy instruments affect the frequency of cartels, cartel duration, cartel participation, and collusive prices. The book then considers the design of competition law and enforcement, examining such topics as the formula for penalties and leniency programs. The book concludes with suggested future lines of inquiry into illegal collusion.

Keywords: anti-trust; economics; econometrics; unlawful; theoretical; law; business; companies; firm behavior; market; anti-competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
Edition: 1
ISBN: 0-262-03693-2
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtp:titles:0262036932

Access Statistics for this book

More books in MIT Press Books from The MIT Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by The MIT Press (mitp-repec@mit.edu).