Does "Skin in the Game" Reduce Risk Taking? Leverage, Liability, and the Long-run Consequences of the New Deal Banking Reforms

Kris James Mitchener and Gary Richardson

A chapter in The Microeconomics of New Deal Policy, 2012 from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

JEL-codes: E44 G28 G33 N22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Journal Article: Does “skin in the game” reduce risk taking? Leverage, liability and the long-run consequences of new deal banking reforms (2013)
Working Paper: Does "Skin in the Game" Reduce Risk Taking? Leverage, Liability and the Long-Run Consequences of New Deal Banking Reforms (2013)
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