Distributional Incentives in an Equilibrium Model of Domestic Sovereign Default

Pablo D'Erasmo and Enrique Mendoza

A chapter in Sovereign Debt and Financial Crises, 2013 from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

JEL-codes: E44 E6 F34 H63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Related works:
Journal Article: DISTRIBUTIONAL INCENTIVES IN AN EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF DOMESTIC SOVEREIGN DEFAULT (2016)
Journal Article: Distributional Incentives in an Equilibrium Model of Domestic Sovereign Default (2016)
Working Paper: Distributional Incentives in an Equilibrium Model of Domestic Sovereign Default (2016)
Working Paper: Distributional Incentives in an Equilibrium Model of Domestic Sovereign Default (2015)
Working Paper: Distributional Incentives in an Equilibrium Model of Domestic Sovereign Default (2013)
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