Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits in the European Union

Mark Hallerberg () and Juergen von Hagen

A chapter in Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, 1999, pp 209-232 from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

JEL-codes: H60 H61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (162)

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Working Paper: Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits in the European Union (1997)
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