 Group Behaviour and Development: Is the Market Destroying Cooperation?Edited by Judith Heyer, Frances Stewart and Rosemary Thorp in OUP Catalogue from Oxford University Press Abstract: This book focuses on group behaviour in developing countries. It includes studies of producer and community organizations, NGOs, and some public sector groups. Despite the fact that most economic decisions are taken by people acting within groups -- families, firms, neighbourhood or community associations, and networks of producers -- the analysis of group functioning has not received enough attention, particularly among economists. Some groups function well, from the perspectives of equity, efficiency, and well-being, while others do not. This book explores why. It covers groups that perform three types of function: overcoming market failures (e.g. producer organizations); improving the position of their members (e.g. Trade Unions), and distributing resources to the less well-off (e.g. NGOs and the public sector). It contrasts three modes of group behaviour: power and control; cooperation; and the use of material incentives. It explores what determines modes of behaviour of groups, and the consequences for efficiency, equity, and well-being. The book includes eleven case studies by different authors, including producers' associations in Brazil, farmers' organizations in Korea and Taiwan, community forestry groups in South Asia, organizations of sex-workers in Calcutta, and health NGOs in Uganda. Claims groups tended to be the most cooperative, cooperation fostering empowerment and self-esteem. Distributive or pro bono groups mostly operated according to power and control, while market failure groups often combined all three modes. The studies show the strong impact of norms in society as a whole on group behaviour. The recent shift towards a stronger role for market incentives has exerted powerful pressures on groups to use more material incentives, undermining the cooperation essential to sustain efficiency and equity. The universal presumption in favour of monetary incentives needs to be abandoned. Non-market behaviour needs to be valued and protected as well. Contributors to this volume - Bina Agarwal (University of Delhi) Sabina Alkire (University of Cambridge) Tito Bianchi (MIT) Larry Burmeister (University of Kentucky) Christy Cannon Lorgen (risk mitigation consultant, Kroll Associates) Severine Deneulin (Doctoral student, University of Oxford) Frederic Gaspart (University of Namur, Belgium) Lucy Gilson (health economist) Nandini Gooptu (University of Oxford) Judith Heyer (University of Oxford) Maureen Mackintosh (Open University) Simeen Mahmud (Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies) Jean-Philippe Platteau (University of Namur, Belgium) Gustav Ranis (Yale University) J. Mohan Rao (University of Massachusetts, Amherst) David Sneath (Cambridge University) Frances Stewart (University of Oxford) Rosemary Thorp (University of Oxford) Paula Tibandebage (Economic and Social Research Foundation) Michael Wang (Formerly of University of Oxford and Yale University) Date: 2002 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oxp:obooks:9780199256921 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from Access Statistics for this book More books in OUP Catalogue from Oxford University Press |
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