Why Unconditional Transfers Are Not Exploitative

Simon Birnbaum

Chapter Chapter 4 in Basic Income Reconsidered, 2012, pp 89-116 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract In order to define and introduce the central task of part II, I will begin this chapter by placing some of the most important claims of part I in a broader perspective. Chapter 2 identified a number of reasons for why the demands of equality of status and, more specifically, basic autonomy offer important grounds for why a basic income solution would be preferable to its conditional rivals. Up until now, I have assumed that there may be a broad compatibility between the objectives of promoting equality of status, on the one hand, and counteracting the impact of brute luck on people’s economic life prospects (i.e., equality of opportunity), on the other.

Keywords: Basic Income; Exploitation Objection; Restriction Objection; Unconditional Distribution; Brute Luck (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:etbchp:978-1-137-01542-6_4

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DOI: 10.1057/9781137015426_4

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