Person-Affecting Paretian Egalitarianism with Variable Population Size

Bertil Tungodden and Peter Vallentyne

Chapter 11 in Intergenerational Equity and Sustainability, 2007, pp 176-200 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Where there is a fixed population (i.e., one whose existence does not depend on what choice an agent makes), the deontic version of anonymous Paretian egalitarianism holds that an option is just if and only if (1) it is anonymously Pareto optimal (i.e., no feasible alternative has a permutation that is Pareto superior), and (2) it is no less equal than any other anonymously Pareto optimal option. We shall develop and discuss a version of this approach for the variable population case (i.e., where who exists does depend on what choice an agent makes). More specifically, we develop and discuss it in the context of a person-affecting framework — in which an option is just if and only if it wrongs no one according to certain plausible conditions on wronging.

Keywords: Feasible Alternative; Feasible Option; Admissible Condition; Equality Weak; Population Case (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:intecp:978-0-230-23676-9_11

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230236769_11

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