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Human Reproduction and Utility Functions: An Evolutionary Approach

Alexander A. Vasin
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Alexander A. Vasin: Moscow State University

Chapter 5 in Psychology, Rationality and Economic Behaviour, 2005, pp 106-124 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The basic models of game theory and economics involve individual utility or payoff functions. Each player or participant is characterized by his set of strategies and exogenously-given payoff function. He independently sets his strategy, which influences not only his payoff, but also the payoffs of other participants. The models describe an individual’s behaviour as aimed at maximizing his payoff function. The theory studies methods and outcomes of rational strategic choices. A standard assumption is that each player knows the payoff functions of all participants. The case of incomplete information about the payoff functions of other players is also studied; for instance, through the Bayesian (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) and maximin (see Germeyer, 1976) approaches. Note that under both complete and incomplete information the payoff functions are exogenously given and do not change.

Keywords: Utility Function; Nash Equilibrium; Payoff Function; Evolutionary Mechanism; Cooperative Behaviour (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:intecp:978-0-230-52234-3_5

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230522343_5

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