Jury Size and Composition: An Economic Approach

Alvin K. Klevorick
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Alvin K. Klevorick: Yale University

Chapter 5 in The Economics of Public Services, 1977, pp 75-115 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The facilities and processes that governments provide for resolving legal disputes constitute an important public service. For the resolution of some of these disputes, society turns to a body of laymen—a jury. In considering the fury as a conflict-resolving instrument, several interrelated questions arise concerning the jury’s size, the way its members are selected, and the voting rule that it uses in reaching its decision. This paper presents a theoretical structure to help address these questions. The model, which uses a statistical decision-theoretic framework, is then used to examine the specific issue of how ‘representative’ a jury should be.

Keywords: Criminal Justice System; Reasonable Doubt; Innocent Defendant; Stochastic Interaction; Jury Selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1977
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:intecp:978-1-349-02917-4_5

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-02917-4_5

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