Time Consistency and Trigger Mechanisms in Open-Economy Monetary Policy Games

Matthew B. Canzoneri and Dale Henderson
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Matthew B. Canzoneri: Georgetown University

Chapter 12 in International Finance and Trade in a Polycentric World, 1988, pp 338-368 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Recently attention has been focused on open-economy monetary policy games in which today’s target variables are affected by credible announcements about future money supplies.1 In this paper we provide examples of this type of monetary policy game and draw some lessons from them.2

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Real Exchange Rate; Money Supply; Real Interest Rate; Excess Demand (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1988
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:intecp:978-1-349-09745-6_12

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-09745-6_12

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