 Concluding Remarks on Part VKoichi Hamada
A chapter in International Finance and Trade in a Polycentric World, 1988, pp 389-391 from Palgrave Macmillan Abstract: Abstract In this session there was discussion on macropolicy co-ordination and micro or industrial policy co-ordination. The papers by Dr Landmann and Professors Canzoneri and Henderson were on macropolicy coordination. Professor Itoh’s paper was on industrial policy co-ordination. On the first topic two questions are asked. Is macroeconomic cooperation necessary or desirable? Is game theory or related analysis meaningful or useful in understanding this policy co-operation issue? Landmann’s paper is directed to the first question. The answer is: It may be necessary or desirable but it will be very hard to achieve a desirable macroeconomic co-ordination. We have differences in perception of the world; we do not have common indicators; it is very hard to make it politically feasible even if we agree on what kind of corporation is desirable. Professor Frankel provided vivid examples to show that if the perception about reality is different, then sometimes co-operation may yield an undesirable outcome. Keywords: Game Theory; Industrial Policy; Flexible Exchange Rate; Sequential Equilibrium; Folk Theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:intecp:978-1-349-09745-6_17 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-09745-6_17 Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in International Economic Association Series from Palgrave Macmillan |
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