Equilibrium and Rationality: Context and History-Dependence

Jean-François Mertens

Chapter 12 in Issues in Contemporary Economics, 1991, pp 198-211 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract I will first argue that a full solution theory for non-co-operative games requires several levels of analysis — the self-enforcing aspect (‘equilibrium’) being only the first of them, and that each of those levels has its own invariance (‘context-independence’) requirements. Of those different levels, only the first is more or less well understood.

Keywords: Mixed Strategy; Pure Strategy; Solution Concept; Reasonable Theory; Sequential Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1991
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Working Paper: EQUILIBRIUM AND RATIONALITY CONTEXT AND HISTORY- DEPENDENCE (1989)
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-11573-0_13

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