 A Solution to the Problem of Mass ElectionsChapter 15 in Issues in Contemporary Economics, 1991, pp 287-294 from Palgrave Macmillan Abstract: Abstract We shall review a solution to the problem of mass elections which has been developed during the past ten years. I have both existence and uniqueness results. Our approach is axiomatic in the following sense. We consider the following properties of social choice functions: (i) anonymity; (ii) Pareto-optimality; (iii) monotonicity; and (iv) exact and strong consistency. Properties (i)-(iii) are well-known. Property (iv) is defined as follows. A social choice function F is exactly and strongly consistent if, for each profile of true preferences RN, the sincere outcome F(RN) is also the outcome of some strong equilibrium point of the voting game determined by F and RN. Let ϕ) be the set of all social choice functions that satisfy (i)-(iv) and let F ∈ ϕ. Because F is anonymous and Pareto-optimal, the size of a minimal winning coalition with respect to F, k(F), is well-defined. Finally, F* is a solution to the problem of mass elections if F* ∈ ϕ and k(F*) ≤ k(F) for all F ∈ ϕ. Thus our solution is defined by axioms (i) to (iv) and the foregoing minimality condition. Keywords: Social Choice; Strong Consistency; Social Choice Function; Strategic Vote; Vote Procedure (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:intecp:978-1-349-11573-0_16 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-11573-0_16 Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in International Economic Association Series from Palgrave Macmillan |
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