The Complexity of Strategies and the Resolution of Conflict: An Introduction

Ariel Rubinstein
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Ariel Rubinstein: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Chapter 2 in Global Macroeconomics: Policy Conflict and Cooperation, 1987, pp 17-42 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Whenever we have to choose a rule of behaviour we are confronted with the following dilemma: on the one hand we would like the rule to serve our goals and interests in the best possible way, and on the other hand we would like the rule to be as simple (as uncomplicated) as possible. As economists, we very often feel that it is unreasonable to allow economic agents to choose arbitrary rules of behaviour. Frequently we restrict the set of feasible rules by omitting those which are ‘not simple enough’. However, it is only recently that economic theorists have begun to model explicitly the endogenous choice of complexity of rules of behaviour. It is the purpose of this paper to introduce the reader to some of these developments.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Equilibrium Outcome; Finite Automaton; Repeated Game; Stage Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1987
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:intecp:978-1-349-18916-8_2

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-18916-8_2

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