The Paradox of Governing by Legislating

Giovanni Sartori
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Giovanni Sartori: Columbia University

Chapter 10 in Comparative Constitutional Engineering, 1994, pp 161-172 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract I was saying that the problems of presidentialism are not in the executive arena but in the legislative arena. Thus far, therefore, I have answered only the easy part of the question, How strong should an intermittent president be allowed to be? Its difficult part begins with asking, How can his governing avoid parliamentary obstructionism? More exactly put, How much legislative power does a president need in order to have his legislation passed by parliament?

Keywords: Veto Power; Emergency Power; Parliamentary Committee; American President; Parliamentary Government (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-22861-4_10

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