Employment Contracts, Finance and the Distribution of Wealth

A. F. Newman
Additional contact information
A. F. Newman: Columbia University

Chapter 9 in Property Relations, Incentives and Welfare, 1997, pp 219-242 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Given technology, preferences and information, which manner of organizing production will survive in a competitive environment? Is hierarchy with monitors and employees a necessary outcome of efficient contracting, or are there conditions under which other organizational forms (such as partnerships) might be viable? In answering these questions, one must take into account the free entry of agents into the different occupations — for example, entrepreneur, manager, employee, partner — that each type of organization entails; the factors which determine occupational choice also affect the competitive selection of organizational form.

Keywords: Capital Market; Agency Cost; Excess Demand; Employment Relation; Employment Contract (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:intecp:978-1-349-25287-9_9

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.palgrave.com/9781349252879

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-25287-9_9

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in International Economic Association Series from Palgrave Macmillan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().