Discussion of Le Breton’s Paper

Andrey Malishevski
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Andrey Malishevski: Institute of Control Sciences

A chapter in Social Choice Re-examined, 1997, pp 97-100 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The Arrow impossibility theorem demonstrates that the only way to avoid the dictatorship phenomenon in the framework of the Arrovian axiomatic model is to weaken at least one of the axioms, other than the non-dictatorship axiom. Thus, under the Pareto principle, generally two axioms are liable to be weakened: Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (HA) and Domain Non-restrictedness (DN). Michel Le Breton considers the second possibility, the case of restricted domains stemming from economic interpretations where the restrictedness is inherent in the essence of a problem. Moreover, he distinguishes two aspects of the restrictedness: (i) restrictedness of preference profiles, and (ii) restrictedness of domains of social choice correspondences. The second aspect has been proved to be the most important for escaping dictatorship.

Date: 1997
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-25849-9_8

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