Axiomatic Analysis of Resource Allocation Problems

Herve Moulin and William Thomson
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William Thomson: University of Rochester

Chapter 5 in Social Choice Re-examined, 1997, pp 101-120 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Fair division is as old as mathematics. According to the Roman historian Proclus, the litigious division of land after the yearly flood of the Nile triggered the invention of geometry by the Egyptians, and the necessities of trade and commerce that of arithmetic by the Phoenicians (see Guilbaud, 1952). The modern literature on fair allocation is however very new. Its origin can be traced back to three seminal papers: on the one hand, Nash’s (1950) paper on the bargaining problem and Shapley’s (1953) paper on coalitional form games; on the other hand, Foley’s (1967) essay introducing the no-envy test for the distribution of unproduced resources.

Keywords: Social Choice; Cooperative Game; Allocation Rule; Resource Allocation Problem; Social Choice Function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-25849-9_9

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