Credibility, Seigniorage and Government Debt in a Monetary Union

Bernd Huber
Additional contact information
Bernd Huber: University of Munich

Chapter 9 in The Debt Burden and its Consequences for Monetary Policy, 1998, pp 233-253 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract In the debate on the European Monetary Union (EMU) one major issue is the fiscal rules of the Maastricht Treaty which impose ceilings on the government debt and deficits of the countries joining the EMU. There now exists a large body of literature on the potential benefits and costs of these debt rules: see, for example, Buiter et al. (1993) for a survey. One important question in this discussion is, of course, whether these debt rules are needed to prevent excessive inflation in a monetary union. While some contributions — for example Aizenman (1992), and van der Ploeg (1991) — support this view,2 other authors — for example Beetsma and Bovenberg (1995a,b) — have argued that these debt rules are unnecessary or may even be counterproductive in the sense that they will raise inflation in the union.

Keywords: Monetary Policy; Central Bank; Member Country; European Central Bank; Monetary Union (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:intecp:978-1-349-26077-5_9

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.palgrave.com/9781349260775

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-26077-5_9

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in International Economic Association Series from Palgrave Macmillan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().