 Corruption and Rent-SeekingJohn Mukum Mbaku
Chapter 10 in The Political Dimension of Economic Growth, 1998, pp 193-211 from Palgrave Macmillan Abstract: Abstract In recent years, social scientists have become increasingly interested in the study of the political dimension of economic growth and development. Part of this interest can be found in the belief that traditional constructs have not been policy-relevant, especially since they usually fail to emphasize the importance of laws and institutions to economic growth. For example, the neo-classical economics model deals only with choice-through-markets, whereas its policy recommendations are usually implemented through non-market processes by a bureaucracy whose behaviour is not within the model. The state is treated as the ‘exogenous, omni-competent and costless instrument for the implementation of policies promoting “economic efficiency”’ (Wiseman, 1990, p. 105). In recent years, the public-choice model has emerged as a more intellectually satisfying approach to the study of public policy. Keywords: Public Choice; Civil Servant; Corrupt Behaviour; Private Exchange; Corrupt Activity (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:intecp:978-1-349-26284-7_10 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-26284-7_10 Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in International Economic Association Series from Palgrave Macmillan |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.