Efficiency and Stability of Relationships with Local Altruistic Commitment

Ottorino Chillemi and Benedetto Gui
Additional contact information
Ottorino Chillemi: University of Padua
Benedetto Gui: University of Padua

Chapter 21 in The Economics of Reciprocity, Giving and Altruism, 2000, pp 359-374 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Continuing interaction with the same partners may ensure greater joint surplus than switching to new partners. When this is so, one can say that past history has led to the accumulation of relation-specific assets, and economic analysis of the relationship boils down to studying the creation and exploitation of such assets. Indeed, bargaining costs may dissipate part of their potential returns, and correspondingly reduce the value of the assets themselves. Furthermore, in an ex ante perspective, investment costs are also to be accounted for, so surplus maximization is subject to even stricter individual incentive compatibility constraints.

Date: 2000
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:intecp:978-1-349-62745-5_21

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.palgrave.com/9781349627455

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-62745-5_21

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in International Economic Association Series from Palgrave Macmillan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().