Cohesive Institutions and the Distribution of Political Rents: Theory and Evidence

Timothy Besley and Hannes Mueller

Chapter 7 in Institutions, Governance and the Control of Corruption, 2018, pp 165-208 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract This paper considers how public resources are distributed across groups and how this depends on the institutional environment. It shows how executive constraints and openness should matter to this and argues that a key role for institutions is to protect politically excluded groups. It develops an approach to judging political institutions based on the idea that cohesive institutions play a role when there is uncertainty about the allocation of political power. Using spatial data on night light, it shows inequality is lower with executive constraints. In addition, politically excluded groups do better within countries when such constraints are in force.

Keywords: Political rents; Executive constraints; Inclusive politics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:intecp:978-3-319-65684-7_7

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-65684-7_7

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