Fighting Political Corruption: Evidence from Brazil

Claudio Ferraz and Frederico Finan ()
Additional contact information
Frederico Finan: UC Berkeley

Chapter 9 in Institutions, Governance and the Control of Corruption, 2018, pp 253-284 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Political corruption is widespread across many developing countries and it is considered a major impediment to economic development. But we have limited evidence on the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies. This chapter summarizes the extent to which government audits of public resources reduces corruption in the context of Brazils anti-corruption program that randomly audits municipalities for their use of federal funds.

Keywords: Corruption; Audits; Political selection; Political accountability; Judicial accountability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:intecp:978-3-319-65684-7_9

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.palgrave.com/9783319656847

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-65684-7_9

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in International Economic Association Series from Palgrave Macmillan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().