Why Do People Obey Norms?

Shinji Teraji

Chapter Chapter 2 in Evolving Norms, 2016, pp 65-142 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract In this chapter presents some reasons why people comply with social norms. First, in large measure, people do what they do because they have learned from those who surround them. The society is sustained by processes favorable to individuals endowed with some docility in following rules. Second, social norms can be sustained if the pecuniary advantage from breaking norms is not sufficient to offset the forgone reputation effect. Third, people comply with norms because the threat of punishment makes it in their interest to do so. Fourth, norms are represented as Nash equilibria of games played by rational agents, and as such they are self-enforcing. Finally, correlated equilibrium allows players’ actions to be statistically dependent on some random signals external to the model.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Social Norm; Coordination Problem; Aspiration Level; Public Good Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:paichp:978-1-137-50247-6_2

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DOI: 10.1057/978-1-137-50247-6_2

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