Natural Resource Policy: Avoiding the Tragedy of the Commons

Gary D. Lynne ()
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Gary D. Lynne: University of Nebraska–Lincoln

Chapter Chapter 12 in Metaeconomics, 2020, pp 215-228 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The issue is how to avoid the tragedy of the commons arising out of excessive greed. The mainstream neoclassical and libertarian economics solution is to turn the common and public property in such things as water into private property. Intriguingly, privatizing does not solve it: private property in Spaceship Earth systems can easily lead to the tragedy of the anti-commons. Just because it is owned in a private property does not guarantee that excessive greed will not destroy it. Metaeconomics clarifies that solving both the commons and anti-commons problems requires finding good balance in private and public property, balance in Market and Government: temper and bound the Greed in both realms. Carbon taxes, carbon markets, and the sulfur emissions markets are explored as a case in point.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-50601-8_12

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