The Beginning of the Crisis: Thailand

Haider Khan ()

Chapter 2 in Global Markets and Financial Crises in Asia, 2004, pp 9-26 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Over the course of a number of years during the 1980s and 1990s the Thai monetary authorities had, with some justification, earned a reputation for sound monetary management. Likewise, the fiscal authorities had run a tight conservative budget policy throughout most of this period. A relatively open economy, Thailand had earned high praise from the IMF and the World Bank as well as foreign investors for its apparently sound economic policies. With a kind of aleatory irony that in retrospect has indeed assumed historic proportions, Thailand became the epicentre of the financial earthquake in Asia. In July 1997 the World Bank’s model Southeast Asian developing economy turned out to be the weakest link in the chain of Asian finance. The devaluation of the baht triggered almost accidentally a region-wide crisis. How did this come to pass?

Keywords: Interest Rate; Monetary Policy; Central Bank; Foreign Exchange; Commercial Bank (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-00079-7_2

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230000797_2

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