The optimal policy mix and logic of a social pact
Sebastian Dullien ()
Chapter 7 in The Interaction of Monetary Policy and Wage Bargaining in the European Monetary Union, 2004, pp 194-227 from Palgrave Macmillan
Abstract From the reasoning of the preceding chapters, one can deduce how an optimal policy mix would look with regard to monetary policy and wage increases. From Chapter 5, we know that in a world of endogenous inside money, nominal wage developments are central for the path of the equilibrium price level. Wage moderation by itself cannot change output or employment. For output to increase, aggregate demand has to be increased, which can be done by cutting interest rates.1 As wage bargainers thus cannot by themselves increase employment, while the central bank cannot by itself ensure price stability, some kind of cooperation is desirable if the target of both high employment and low and stable inflation is to be achieved.
Keywords: Monetary Policy; Central Bank; Nominal Wage; Unit Labour Cost; Wage Bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-00614-0_7
Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this chapter
More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().