Moral Hazard in Property Tax Administration: A Comparative Analysis of the Czech and Slovak Republics

Phillip J. Bryson

Chapter Chapter 4 in The Economics of Centralism and Local Autonomy, 2010, pp 53-64 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract A federalist country adopting a tax must decide which level of government will design tax policy, which will administer the tax, and which will collect the revenues. Often, the same level of government performs all three functions, just as the federal income tax is handled in the United States. Of course it need not happen this way. In Taiwan, the value-added tax is largely administered at the provincial level, policies governing its use are set by the national government, and the revenue is split between the two government levels. In the United States, state governments establish property tax policy and local governments administer the property tax, but the majority of the revenue goes to school districts, which have no policy or administrative role in the process.

Keywords: Local Government; Central Government; Slovak Republic; Fiscal Decentralization; Moral Hazard Problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-11201-8_4

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.palgrave.com/9780230112018

DOI: 10.1057/9780230112018_4

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().