Institutional Ordering after the Exodus

Sigmund Wagner-Tsukamoto
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Sigmund Wagner-Tsukamoto: University of Leicester

Chapter 5 in Is God an Economist?, 2009, pp 169-202 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The Exodus from Egypt left the Israelites in a state where a new societal contract and new institutional structures were needed. As members of the Egyptian society they had shared into Egypt’s institutional governance structures, from jurisdiction to work allocation and wage arrangements, property laws, etc. As a newly independent nation Israel had to address questions of social order, societal contracting and related questions of conflict resolution. Institutional issues of state formation had to be addressed and the Old Testament here holds important lessons on the early history of an economic theory of state formation. An especially critical question for Israel concerning state formation in this connection was whether and, if so, how pluralism as an interaction condition was still mastered after the Exodus.

Keywords: Moral Disagreement; Neighbouring Nation; Mutual Gain; Institutional Order; Behavioural Contracting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-23409-3_6

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230234093_6

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