Welfare to Work

Seppo Honkapohja and Frank Westermann
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Frank Westermann: EEAG

Chapter 1 in Designing the European Model, 2009, pp 35-60 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Social policy evens out the distribution of income. It prevents social unrest, it satisfies the taxpayers’ sense of justice and it insures against random variations in people’s lifetime careers. Ideally, it insures risks that are not privately insurable, either because risk markets suffer from adverse selection or because private insurance comes too late in a person’s life, when the veil of ignorance has already been lifted.

Keywords: Adverse Selection; Risk Market; Publisher Limited; Social Unrest; Lifetime Career (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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DOI: 10.1057/9780230236653_2

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