Regional Trading Arrangements and WTO Membership: Substitutes or Complements?

Richard Pomfret

Chapter 6 in Is the World Trade Organization Attractive Enough for Emerging Economies?, 2010, pp 176-191 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract This chapter asks whether regional trading arrangements (RTAs) are substitutes for or complements to World Trade Organization (WTO) Membership. From the start of the current international trade regime there has been a tension between the nondiscrimination mandated in Article I of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), requiring most favored nation (MFN) treatment, and the predilection of GATT signatories and WTO Members for discriminatory trading arrangements. The initial negotiations leading to GATT were characterized by an Anglo-U.S. conflict over Imperial Preferences, which were grandfathered despite strong U.S. antipathy and soon after signing the GATT the largest continental European economies established the European Coal and Steel Community setting off on the path to a customs union.1

Keywords: European Union; World Trade Organization; Custom Union; North American Free Trade Agreement; European Economic Community (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-25082-6_7

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230250826_7

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