Adverse Selection and Imperfect Information

Colin Read
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Colin Read: SUNY College

Chapter 12 in The Fear Factor, 2009, pp 105-111 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract We entrust to others the task of ensuring that our corporations are well run, our markets well regulated, and our assets kept safe. We cannot always ensure that the agents we hire will actually perform this duty. In an environment with imperfect information, many problems can arise that will confound our trust.

Keywords: Financial Market; Adverse Selection; Imperfect Information; Perfect Competition; Market Confidence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-25086-4_13

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230250864_13

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