Within the White House

Robert Leeson

Chapter 20 in Ideology and the International Economy, 2003, pp 160-164 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Friedman attempted to both cultivate contacts and to neutralise the influence of opponents. This latter project is illustrated by his antagonistic exchanges with one of Nixon’s friends, Pierre Rinfret, an influential New York investment adviser, who had been under consideration both as a CEA member and as Treasury Secretary (Ehrlichman 1982, 258). Rinfret was sufficiently close to Nixon to be used by Burns as a messenger. According to Rinfret, in spring 1971 he was invited to have lunch with Burns so as to relay the message to Nixon that the Fed would ‘not be party to inflation’. But Nixon told Rinfret he was ‘about the hundredth person Dr Burns has asked to deliver the message’.1

Keywords: Monetary Policy; Chicago Convention; Electoral Fraud; Eisenhower Administration; Chicago Economist (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-28602-3_20

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.palgrave.com/9780230286023

DOI: 10.1057/9780230286023_20

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().