 IntroductionDavid Mayes, Liisa Halme and Aarno Liuksila Chapter 1 in Improving Banking Supervision, 2001, pp 1-10 from Palgrave Macmillan Abstract: Abstract In many countries bank failures are largely unheard of and the idea of a threat to the financial system seems remote. Even in the United Kingdom, where names like Barings and BCCI spring readily to mind, there is no expectation of any serious threat to the main banks. While most retail deposits are insured, depositors do not rely on the insurance in order to feel their deposits are safe. Although banking inherently involves taking risks, those risks have been thought relatively minor, especially across large institutions. In other countries, such as the United States, bank failures are more common and depositors do have an eye to insurance, especially since the Savings and Loan difficulties in the 1980s. Even large problems with individual banks can appear manageable,1 as with Credit Lyonnais, for example. Banking crises are associated with the developing world. In this environment it is easy for complacency to set in. Both supervisors and the supervised can convince themselves that existing safeguards are adequate, rather than accepting that they have been lucky not to face more exacting shocks. Keywords: Asset Price; Euro Area; Moral Hazard; International Financial Reporting Standard; Market Discipline (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-28819-5_1 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.