Corruption, Policy Inadequacy and the Greek Constitution

Michael Mitsopoulos and Theodore Pelagidis

Chapter 3 in Understanding the Crisis in Greece, 2011, pp 24-54 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Both corruption and the way individual preferences are transformed into collective policy choices by democracies have received widespread attention in the literature. The literature has investigated in great detail how the design of political systems and the incentives, that affect both individuals and officials, determine their behavior toward corruption and democratic policy choice, and the ultimate outcome for both individuals and society as a whole. This work has placed, in addition, great emphasis on the significance accountability has. At the same time seminal work has strived to understand how the structure of these policital systems affects the ability of the different political systems to aggregate and effectively enforce the policies that are preferred by society.

Keywords: Prime Minister; Political System; Proportional Representation; Simple Majority; Executive Branch (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-29475-2_3

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230294752_3

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