Lessons for BP from More Considered Reviews

Colin Read
Additional contact information
Colin Read: SUNY College

Chapter 14 in BP and the Macondo Spill, 2011, pp 124-137 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract There is little doubt now that there was not one single engineering, equipment, or human failure that led to the Macondo disaster. The oil industry now well knows that complex systems create the possibility of complex failures. The Challenger space shuttle disaster has taught engineers that risk management must expand in proportion to the complexity of engineered systems. What is less understood, even today, is the role of management systems that can rival in sophistication the engineering systems designed to mitigate risk. After all, as BP’s own engineering analysis shows, even multiple engineering safeguards and sophisticated data acquisition may fail if humans cannot properly manage an enterprise growing in complexity.

Keywords: Remotely Operate Vehicle; Drill Pipe; Production Casing; Deepwater Horizon; Cement Slurry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-30508-3_14

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.palgrave.com/9780230305083

DOI: 10.1057/9780230305083_14

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().