 Linking Economic and Social-Exchange Games: From the Community Norm to CSRChapter 5 in Social Capital, Corporate Social Responsibility, Economic Behaviour and Performance, 2011, pp 129-148 from Palgrave Macmillan Abstract: Abstract Why are corporations engaged in various non-economic activities to meet societal demands (such as environmental protection) beyond their legal obligations? In other words, why do corporations ‘over-comply’ (Heal 2005) with the social demands? Does it benefit corporations (their stockholders)? If so, how? Common-sense-wise an answer may appear obvious. However, it may not necessarily be so for the prevailing framework of economists’ thinking: ‘corporations do not need to do anything beyond legal obligations in order to serve stockholders interests’. The object of this chapter is to suggest an analytical framework to challenge such orthodox views without abandoning the premise of a bounded-rationality of agents concerned (various stakeholders of corporations as well as the citizens of the society). An essential idea is to endogenize the relevance of such social constructs as (individual) social capital, norms, status ascriptions and the like to economic behaviors within an expanded framework of game-theoretic thinking. Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility; Social Capital; Social Norm; Social Exchange; Community Norm (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-30618-9_6 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan |
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