Are Justifying Reasons Motivating?

Jan Jonge

Chapter X in Rethinking Rational Choice Theory, 2012, pp 148-161 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The basic claim of rational choice theory is that intentional action is to be explained by reference to the beliefs and desires of the agent. Hume, like many philosophers today, argued that the role of knowledge (beliefs) is limited to the discernment of means to ends. To be motivated to act requires a psychological state (a pro-attitude), which only desires can provide. Whereas beliefs are motivationally inert, desires provide the passion that activates the agent. A non-Humean alternative would be one in which a genuinely cognitive state is doing the motivation. Pure cognitivism supposes that a complete motivating state can consist of nothing but (objective) reasons. It assumes that where there is motivation there will be desire. But it understands the desire as the state of being motivated rather than as some part of what motivates. What motivates an agent are his or her beliefs about (desirable) states of affairs.

Keywords: Cognitive State; Rational Choice Theory; Humean Theory; External Reason; Internal Reason (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-35554-5_12

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.palgrave.com/9780230355545

DOI: 10.1057/9780230355545_12

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().