Framing and Ranking

Jan Jonge

Chapter XI in Rethinking Rational Choice Theory, 2012, pp 162-173 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract It is a well-established fact that agents react to the way prospects are framed (see Tversky and Thaler 1990). Decision-makers also frame decisions, for instance because the decision must reflect their social or moral concerns in contrast to their material ambitions. When decisions are framed, the question arises as to whether this has consequences for the ranking of preferences. Does this lead to conflicting motives when considering prospects and, as a consequence, to multiple rankings?

Keywords: Utility Theory; Formation Rule; Expected Utility Theory; Rational Choice Theory; Moral Standing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1057/9780230355545_13

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