 Justice as FairnessJan Jonge Chapter XVI in Rethinking Rational Choice Theory, 2012, pp 232-252 from Palgrave Macmillan Abstract: Abstract Rawls locates the basis of reasonable agreement not in the claims of individual preferences, but in the fact that individuals are to be conceived of as citizens, who seek areas of agreement in building the basic principles and institutions of their shared political life. The justice of social and political institutions is judged by their tendency to counteract the material inequalities deriving from birth, talent and circumstances. His point of departure is the same as that of Harsanyi: an original position characterized by a veil of ignorance. What would be the appropriate claims to make on behalf of the citizens? Rawls argues that in the special circumstances of deciding behind a veil of ignorance it is rational first to seek to safeguard basic political and personal liberties and second to minimize the costs of winding up at the bottom. Therefore the parties in the original position will judge basic social and economic institutions according to the capacity to secure basic liberties and to promote the interests of the least well-off social group. When the parties consider both themselves and their companions as free and morally equal, an equal division is the most obvious option. The reference point for the division of all-means (or primary) goods is, therefore, an equal division. But the size of the societal product is not fixed; rather it depends on individual incentives. It is the incentive problem, which moves Rawls away from strict equality. Inequality in the division of primary goods is therefore allowed if it increases the size of societal product and is in the interest of the group who is worst off. This condition is laid down in the ‘difference principle’. Keywords: Original Position; Difference Principle; Rational Choice Theory; Average Principle; Reflective Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-35554-5_19 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan |
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