Summary

Jan Jonge

A chapter in Rethinking Rational Choice Theory, 2012, pp 323-325 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract For almost a century the representative agent in economic science was a charming, sophisticated character who routinely and resolutely balanced costs and benefits when he had to take a decision. When dual-reasoning systems came into vogue the economic agent was exposed as a feeble-minded hedonist, a myopic individual who has to be supervised and trained to regain some self-control.

Keywords: Deep Brain Stimulation; Distributive Justice; Representative Agent; Ultimatum Game; Rational Choice Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-35554-5_24

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230355545_24

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