Deutsche Telekom and Pacific Bell v. LinkLine: Does Competition Law have a Place in Regulated Industries?

Martin W. Holterman

Chapter 6 in Regulating Technological Innovation, 2011, pp 115-130 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract In the last two years, both the US Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice have been faced with the problem of what to do when competition law and telecommunications regulations collide. In Deutsche Telekom v. Commission,1 the European Court of Justice (here-after: ECJ) agreed that Deutsche Telekom could be guilty of abusing its dominant position on the market for DSL Internet connections by carrying out a so-called price squeeze, whereby a supplier that competes with its own customers seeks to increase its market share by reducing the retail/wholesale margin, that is, the difference between the price charged to its wholesale customers and the price it charges its own retail customers for the finished product. Interestingly, the appellant’s objection that its pricing system was, in any event, approved by the German telecom authorities was deemed irrelevant.2

Keywords: Competition Authority; Creative Destruction; Competition Rule; Network Industry; Predatory Price (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-36745-6_7

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230367456_7

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