Corporate Governance in Japanese Firms: The Body of Employees as the Controlling Group and Friendly Shareholders

Yoshiro Miwa ()

Chapter 11 in Firms and Industrial Organization in Japan, 1996, pp 195-216 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract In the preceding chapters I assumed a neoclassical firm as the basic decision-making unit. This real-world neoclassical firm is controlled by shareholders with the board of directors as the agent of those shareholders. This firm purchases factors of production other than ‘capital’ in the market. The firm’s objective is to maximize profit under given constraints, such as the production function and demand conditions. Also I assume zero transaction costs, unless otherwise stated. Transaction costs are not zero, however, and institutions do matter. If we are interested in the formation and functioning of firms, inter-firm relationships and the market, we must closely examine the validity of the above assumptions. Such an analysis is essential for understanding Japan’s intra-firm organization and inter-firm relationships.

Keywords: Corporate Governance; Small Business; Large Firm; Large Shareholder; Legal Entity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-37146-0_11

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.palgrave.com/9780230371460

DOI: 10.1057/9780230371460_11

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().