Independence: Rhetoric and Reality

Anand Chandavarkar

Chapter 13 in Central Banking in Developing Countries, 1996, pp 218-235 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract No other aspect of central banking has evoked more attention and discussion in every conceivable forum, academic, financial, and political, than the advocacy of central bank independence of politi-cal authority primarily as a countervailing power against the alleged inflationary bias of the executive and the legislature. But this high-powered debate has been conducted largely in the context of the industrial democracies, albeit without much historical perspec-tive, and the terms of the Maastricht Treaty with its absolute prohibition of automatic access for the member countries of the European Community (EC) to credit from the proposed European Central Bank (ECB).’

Keywords: Monetary Policy; Central Bank; European Central Bank; Exchange Rate Regime; Exchange Rate Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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DOI: 10.1057/9780230371507_13

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